“Tolerance” or “Preventive Strike”:Strategic Choice and Strategic Interaction in the Context of Nuclear Proliferation

自核武科技的發展以降，「核擴散」（nuclear proliferation）問題便一直為國際所關注。對特定國家而言，核擴散將因非官方核武國家可能發展或取得核武，而對其安全構成威脅。故對擴散國（proliferator）發展核武潛在可能之因應，便成為其安全戰略的重要一環。可能的因應策略包括容忍並給予經濟誘因、制裁、以及「預防攻擊」（preventive strike）。然而在不同的策略選項間，存在一定程度的取捨關係。本文之目的，即在於探討在此一情境下，影響反擴散國與擴散國所採行之策略的因果機制，將國家的策略選擇與策略互動進一步一般化與理論化，並提供核擴散問題的研究些許理論基礎。本文將以「賽局理論」（Game Theory）之途徑建構核擴散情境下的理論模型，並推導該模型的均衡解，由均衡的「比較靜態分析」（comparative static analysis）進一步延伸理論命題的實質意涵。此外，本文將以「兩次北韓核武危機」、以及「伊拉克戰爭」，作為經驗案例的對照，延伸理論之經驗意涵（empirical implications），並由案例初步驗證所建立並推導的理論模型。本文的研究結果發現，擴散國受到的安全威脅及其技術條件、給予或終止制裁與經濟誘因的條件、反擴散國預防攻擊的成本及其攻擊能力以及雙方之預期將影響此一情境下衝突爆發之可能性。Since the outset of the development of nuclear technology, nuclear proliferation has been a widespread concern in international society. Many states feel that their security is threatened by nuclear proliferation as non-official nuclear states acquire nuclear weapons. Thus, responses toward the proliferators have become an important component of security strategies. Possible responses include granting economic incentives, sanctions, and preventive strikes. However, there is a tradeoff between these strategic choices. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the causal mechanisms that impact the strategic choices of both counter-proliferators and proliferators and to generalize as well as theorize strategic choices and strategic interactions. The paper develops, solves, and analyzes a game-theoretical model to identify equilibrium points, and enumerates the substantive meanings using comparative static analysis. Furthermore, the paper analyzes the cases of the North Korea Nuclear Crisis and Iraq War as empirical counterparts, extending the empirical implications of the theoretical model and provide preliminarily verification for the model. The paper finds that the degree of threat and the technology constraints faced by proliferators, the incentives offered by the counter-proliferators, the cost of launching an attack, the damage caused by an attack, and the expectations of each side affect the likelihood of an outbreak of conflicts under such situations